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ANTITRUST AND HEALTH CARE-PSYCHOLOGISTS ENTITLED TO BLUE
SHIELD REIMBURSEMENT-Virginia Academy of Clinical Psycholo-
gists v. Blue Shield of Virginia, 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
In Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Vir-
ginia, I the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Blue Shield violated
section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act2 because Blue Shield refused to
pay psychologists who did not bill through physicians. The court held that
Blue Shield constituted a conspiracy of individual physicians acting to
reduce competition in the delivery of psychotherapeutic services. This
holding significantly enhances the ability of psychologists and other li-
censed health care providers to compete with physicians.
The defendants in this case were two regional Blue Shield programs,
Blue Shield of Virginia and Blue Shield of Southwestern Virginia, 3 and
1. 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). 15 U.S.C. § 1-2provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ...
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ...
3. Blue Shield of Virginia operates in most of eastern Virginia while Blue Shield of Southwest-
em Virginia operates in the rest of the state. In discussing these two Plans the court in Virginia
Academy observed that:
Blue Shield Plans are not insurance companies, though they are, to a degree, insurers. Rather,
they are generally characterized as prepaid health care plans, quantity purchasers of health care
services. A plan may be viewed as an agent of its subscribers, a buyers cooperative. But in a real
and legal sense, the Blue Shield Plans are agents of their member physicians.
624 F.2d at 480(citations omitted).
The development of health insurance coverage by private insurers and by government has been a
major factor in the evolution of health care as a major industry. The development of health insurance
in this country began in the early part of the 20th century in Washington and Oregon in response to
the hazardous conditions in the lumber, mining, and railroad industries. Private entrepreneurs ar-
ranged to provide health services to groups of consumers or industrial employers through private
physicians. Under these plans, called "contract practices," the group organizer maintained a great
deal of control over the care provided. For example, in order to contain costs, only proven medica-
tions and treatments were covered. Physicians responded to this invasion of their economic as well as
their clinical territory by using their medical societies in the 1930's and 1940's to develop the Blue
Shield Plans. Through Blue Shield, physicians are able to control the type of care provided, the level
of reimbursement, and the payments themselves, which preserve the security of regular payments
despite fluctuations in the national economy. Goldberg & Greenberg, The Effect of Physician Con-
trolled Health Insurance: U.S. v. Oregon State Medical Society, 2 J. HEALTH POL. POLY. & L. 48,
50-60 (1977).
The physicians also established Blue Cross, which covers hospital care, to complement Blue
Shield, which generally covers outpatient care. There is a Blue Shield Program at the national level,
called "control" Blue Shield, which contracts with small participating Plans at the county or state
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the Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia. 4 In 1971 and 1972 these two
Blue Shield Plans met a number of times with each other, with the Neu-
ropsychiatric Society, and with other groups to discuss the scope of men-
tal health coverage in light of an increased number of mental health
claims. 5 The Neuropsychiatric Society recommended that Blue Shield re-
fuse to cover the services of psychologists unless a physician billed Blue
Shield for the psychologist's services. 6 Both Blue Shield Plans imple-
mented a bill-through policy consistent with this recommendation. 7
In 1973 Virginia passed a "Freedom of Choice Statute," which re-
quires prepaid health care plans like Blue Shield to pay directly for ser-
vices rendered by psychologists. 8 Following the enactment of this law,
the Blue Shield Plans collaborated and agreed to continue denying direct
payment in violation of the statute. 9 The Virginia Academy of Clinical
Psychologists filed suit to challenge this practice in the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The district court found for the
level. These individual programs comprise separate market divisions, and do not compete with each
other. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Virginia. 469 F. Supp. 552.
557-58 (E. D. Va. 1979), rev'd. 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
In 1975, two thirds of health care was paid for by third parties. The other one third was paid for
either directly by patients or by charitable donations. Of the third-party payors, government paid for
40% of the total, and private insurance companies for 26%. Blue Cross and Blue Shield account for
approximately one-half of the people who are covered by private insurance. STAFF OF HOUSE COMMt.
ON WAYS AND MEANS, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE RESOURCE BOOK 61 (Aug. 30, 1976).
4. The Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia is a professional organization of psychiatrists. Psy-
chiatrists are medical doctors with advanced training in the diagnosis and treatment of the mentally
ill.
5. 624 F.2d at 478. During the 1960's there was a sharp increase in the number of insurance
claims for mental health problems. From 1962 to 1972, Blue Shield of Virginia also provided direct
payment to clinical psychologists for services provided to Blue Shield subscribers, whereas Blue
Shield of Southwestern Virginia since 1945 has reimbursed only those psychologists who bill through
physicians, with limited exceptions. Id.
Although they are not physicians, clinical psychologists are nevertheless highly trained health-care
professionals. Clinical psychologists are licensed under Va. Code § 54-274. Candidates for licensure
must have a Ph.D. degree in clinical psychology and two years of supervised experience, one of
which must be post-doctoral. Licensed psychologists are authorized to provide psychotherapy. Id.
6. ld. at 478.
7. Id.
8. 1973 Va. Acts ch. 428 (codified as amended at VA. CODE § 38.1-824 (1981)).
9. 624 F.2d at 478. A subscriber and her psychologist filed suit to test the statute in state court.
but were later voluntarily non-suited. Id. In 1974, the State Corporation Commission brought an
action against Blue Shield of Virginia to compel compliance with the statute Id. at 478-79. Blue
Shield of Southwestern Virginia was not a party to either action. In February 1979. the State Corpora-
tion Commission upheld the constitutionality of the state Freedom of Choice Statute. Id. at 479.
In a related case, Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready. 50 U.S.L.W. 4723 (U.S. June 21. 1982)
(No. 81-225), a consumer challenged the bill-through policy based on direct monetary loss because
Blue Shield would not reimburse her for treatment by an independent psychologist. The Supreme
Court held that she had standing to sue under antitrust law.
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defendants. 10 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and held that
the defendants' conduct violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.
This Note discusses Virginia Academy in light of the pertinent antitrust
doctrines. It approves the Fourth Circuit's holding and recognition of
physician control of Blue Shield. It criticizes, however, the court's failure
to label the defendants' conduct a boycott. This Note proposes judicial
application of the per se rule rather than the Rule of Reason in cases such
as Virginia Academy in order to bring them more in line with classic anti-
trust doctrine.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Background ofAntitrust Law
The Sherman Antitrust Act"1 is intended to promote competition by
forbidding monopolies and conspiracies to restrain trade. 12 Increased
competition is expedted to lead to decreased costs and to increased effi-
ciency, and is expected to promote development of new technology. 13
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes contracts, combinations, or con-
spiracies in restraint of trade illegal. There are two principal elements of a
section 1 violation. First, the plaintiff must establish that the defendants
were involved in a "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy.' 14
These three words constitute a single concept 5 often referred to as "con-
certed action" 16 in antitrust law. This element is shown whenever there is
a mutual commitment to restrain trade. 17 Second, the plaintiff must estab-
10. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Virginia, 469 F. Supp. 552
(E.D. Va. 1979), rev'd, 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981). The
district court held that defendants' collaboration did not constitute a conspiracy and that their conduct
did not restrain trade. Id. at 558-59. The district court also held that the defendants' conduct was
exempt under the state action exemption, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. Id. at 557, 558, 563. See generally notes 45, 47, & 50 and accompanying text infra (discussing
these doctrines).
11. 15U.S.C.§§ 1-7 (1976).
12. L. SULLIVAN, ANTrrRUST § 3 (1977).
13. P. AREEDA, ANTrrRusT LAW § 103 (1978). The Sherman Act originally was also intended to
promote certain populist goals, including dispersion of wealth, increased entrepreneurial opportuni-
ties, and limited business size. Id. § 103. Such social goals may at times conflict with economic ones.
Id. § 104. There is also a limit to which the antitrust law can be expected to promote such social
policies. Id. § 105.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), reprinted in part in note 2 supra.
15. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 12, § 109.
16. Id. Concerted action means that competitors act together in order to reduce competition.
17. The definition of agreement is broader than an "explicit, verbally communicated assent to a
common course of action," but the Supreme Court has not clearly identified what constitutes con-
certed action. Turner, The Definition ofAgreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism
and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655, 683 (1962).
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lish that the defendants' contract, combination, or conspiracy is a re-
straint of trade. 18
Courts use two different standards in determining whether certain ac-
tivity is illegal concerted action that restrains trade: the per se rule 19 and
the Rule of Reason. 20 The per se rule is a formal presumption that (1)
certain conduct harms the economy; 2 1 and (2) legitimate objectives are so
rarely present for such conduct that a categorical prohibition is justified. 22
Boycotts are an example of concerted actions that are usually illegal per
se. 23 Boycotts are concerted refusals to deal with competitors or with
those who deal with those competitors. By their nature, boycotts exclude
competitors from the market or coerce those who deal with those compet-
itors to conform to certain trade practices that benefit the conspirators. 24
In contrast, under the Rule of Reason, courts do not presume that the
conduct harms the economy and that the conduct lacks legitimate objec-
tives. Instead, the court examines the market power of the defendant, the
purpose of the conduct, the effect of the conduct on competition, and the
alleged redeeming values of the conduct. 25 For example, courts apply the
Rule of Reason analysis to vertical price fixing when accomplished
through manufacturer-suggested retail prices.26
18. L. SULLIVAN. supra note 12, § 109.
19. For a recent article summarizing the development of the per se rule and the rationale underly-
ing its use, see Wirtz, Purpose and Effect in Sherman Act Conspiracies, 57 WASH. L. REV. 1, 34-39
(1981).
20. See generally National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679.
687-92 (1978) (summarizing the history and rationale underlying the Rule of Reason).
21. E.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1979); North-
ern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,5 (1958); see Standard Oil Co. and Standard Stations,
Inc. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-07 (1949) (discussing economic effects of tying and exclu-
sive-dealing arrangements).
If the defendant has sufficient market power, its anti-competitive conduct is presumed to harm the
economy. E.g., Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6, 11 (1958) (analyzing a tying
arrangement); P. AREEDA, supra note 13, § 314b.
22. E.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1979):
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (asserting that horizontal price fixing can
have "no purpose except stifling of competition"); Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1,5 (1958); United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556 (1960), affdper curiam,
365 U.S. 567 (1961); P. AREEDA, supra note 13, § 314b.
23. See. e.g., Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959); Fashion Originators'
Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941); P. AREEDA, supra note 13, § 314b; see also Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 348 (1963) (dictum). But see Cement Mfrs. Protective
Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 603-06 (1925).
24. Note, Boycott: A Specific Definition Limits the Applicability of a Per Se Rule. 71 Nw. U.L.
REV. 818, 818 (1977).
25. P. AREEDA, supra note 13, § 314b.
26. See Andersen, The Antitrust Consequences of Manufacturer-Suggested Retail Prices-The
Case for Presumptive Illegality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 763, 765 (1979).
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B. Antitrust Law and the Health Care Industry
Before 1975, the health care industry was relatively free from federal
antitrust liability.27 The-health care industry was thought not to meet the
interstate commerce requirement under the Sherman Act.28 In Hospital
Building Co. v. Trustees of the Rex Hospital,29 however, the United
States Supreme Court held that the expenditure of hospital funds for med-
icines and supplies, combined with the hospital's source of funding from
insurance and other out-of-state sources, brought most hospitals within
the definition of interstate commerce. 30
Nevertheless, the rest of the health care industry was thought to be ex-
empt from the Sherman Act because medicine is a learned profession, and
learned professions appeared to be exempt from the antitrust laws. 31 This
was reinforced by the Supreme Court's reluctance to interfere with pro-
fessional medical judgment, despite evidence of anti-competitive con-
duct, in United States v. Oregon State Medical Society. 32 This exemption
27. Health care is a $240 billion industry which employs 4.5 million workers, including a variety
of licensed professionals as well as unlicensed workers. M. THOMPSON, ANTITRUST AND THE HEALTH
CARE PROVIDER 1 (1979). Washington statutes reflect the variety of providers by licensing 18 differ-
ent professions and occupations. See WASH. REV. CODE tit. 18 (1981). These occupations include
psychologists, registered nurses, midwives, optometrists, and physicians. The practice of psychology
is governed by statute. See id. §§ 18.83.010-.900.
28. M. THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 15-16.
29. 425 U.S. 738 (1976). The plaintiff in Hospital Building alleged that two hospital officials
and a health planning officer had conspired to block the expansion of the plaintiff's hospital for the
purpose of enabling a competitor to monopolize hospital services in Raleigh, North Carolina. Id. at
740-41.
30. Id. at 744.
31. See generally Comment, The Professions and Noncommercial Purposes: Applicability of Per
Se Rules Under the Sherman Act, I 1 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 387, 393-96 (1978) (discussing the origins
of the learned professions exception).
32. 343 U.S. 326 (1952). In Oregon State Medical Society, the Court held that the government
failed to prove a conspiracy by the defendant when the medical society had engaged in coercive
behavior in the past, but had more recently developed a competing prepaid medical plan.
The county medical societies adopted policies condemning "contract practice" and pressured doc-
tors to refuse to participate. They threatened to expel members, and one society did expel members,
who engaged in what are now known as health maintenance organizations. Id. at 329. Seven years
before the government filed suit, the medical society changed its strategy and organized a competing
prepaid plan under its own control. The Court reasoned that this indicated a genuine change in atti-
tude on the part of the society. Id. at 334. Although the Court did not reach the issue of the learned
profession exemption, it stated in dictum "that there are ethical considerations where the historic
direct relationship between patient and physician is involved which are quite different than the usual
considerations prevailing in ordinary commercial matters." Id. at 336.
Professors Goldberg and Greenberg argue that the Oregon State Medical Society's prepaid plan
was merely a different route toward the same anti-competitive goal. Goldberg & Greenberg, supra
note 3, at 55. They argue convincingly that the physicians controlled the plans, forced the original
organizations out of business, and thereby discouraged cost-cutting on the part of health insurers. To
support their argument, the authors point out that the consumer is paying much more for health care
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for learned professions in general began to crumble in Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar,33 when the United States Supreme Court held that a law-
yer's service fell within the definition of "commerce" in section 1 of the
Sherman Act, even though law is a learned profession. 34 Similarly, in
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,35 the Su-
preme Court held that engineers are not exempt from the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether medicine
remains a learned profession exempt from the Sherman Act. Lower
courts, however, have extended the trend expressed in Goldfarb and Na-
tional Society of Professional Engineers to medicine. In 1976 the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Ballard v. Blue Shield of Southern
West Virginia, Inc., 36 relied on Goldfarb to hold that the professional sta-
tus of the physician was not a defense to a charge under the Sherman Act.
The court reaffirmed this position in Virginia Academy, holding that phy-
sicians who were members of Blue Shield constituted a conspiracy when
they sought to foreclose competition from clinical psychologists by re-
quiring them to bill Blue Shield only through physicians. 37
II. THE COURT'S REASONING
The Fourth Circuit in Virginia Academy held in a unanimous opinion
that the Blue Shield Plans were conspiracies in restraint of trade. The
court found insufficient evidence of conspiracy by the Neuropsychiatric
Society, however, because the Blue Shield Plans had not followed all of
the Society's recommendations. 38 The court also reasoned that these rec-
ommendations were not illegal without evidence of coercion. 39
and that, unlike insurers in other industries, there have been no successful cost-cutting measures by
health insurers. Id. at 49-50.
33. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
34. The defendants in Goldfarb were held to be in violation of § I of the Sherman Act because
they set uniform legal fees for title searches in connection with residential real estate transactions.
The minimum fee schedule was published and enforced through the possibility of discipline by the
state bar association.
35. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). The Society's code of ethics prohibited members from submitting
competitive bids for engineering services. The Court held that the canon violated § I of the Sherman
Act. The Court applied the Rule of Reason and found both an anti-competitive purpose and effect in
the Society's conduct. Id. at 695-96.
36. 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976). In addition to Ballard, the Fifth Circuit in Feminist Women's
Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 552-553 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924
(1979). refused to apply the learned profession exemption to physicians. See generally notes 88 & 89
and accompanying text infra (discussing Feminist Women's Health Center).
37. 624F.2dat484.
38. Id. at 483. The court reasoned that, although Blue Shield was physician-dominated, it could
operate independently of other entities. Although the Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia
cooperated very closely with Blue Shield, Blue Shield did not accept all of the Society's proposals.
The Society did not control Blue Shield and did not agree to abide by the Society's recommendation.
Vol. 57:617, 1982
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In its reasoning concerning the two Blue Shield defendants, the court
first found that the Blue Shield Plans constituted a conspiracy because
they were "combinations of physicians, operating under the direction and
control of their physician members." ' 40 The court looked at substance
rather than form, 41 and found that the Plans were actually agents of the
physician members who furnish prepaid medical services through this
The court cited United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919), which establishes the right of a"
business to choose with whom it will conduct business. 624 F.2d at 483. Based on these facts and the
Colgate principle, the court held that the Society had not acted illegally in the absence of coercion.
39. 624 F.2d at 483.
40. Id. at 479. The court supported its finding by references to recent Federal Trade Commission
investigations regarding physician control of Blue Shield and to recent scholarly articles. Professors
Goldberg and Greenberg take the position that physicians have been working actively against cost-
cutting measures by insurers in order to protect their economic self-interest. Goldberg & Greenberg,
supra note 3, at 67. Professor Clark Havighurst also argues that physicians have fought systemati-
cally to prevent innovative financing of health care which would operate to reduce costs. Havighurst,
Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 DUKE L.J. 303. Examples of
cost-cutting measures are high deductibles, id. at 321, second-opinion requirements prior to elective
surgery, id. at 322-23, and cash benefits based on a particular diagnosis, id. at 324-25. D. Ward
Kalstrom argues that the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011- 1015 (1976), permits individ-
ual private insurers to agree with individual providers to control health care costs. He suggests that
such activity is preferable to government regulation. Kalstrom, Health Care Cost Control by Third
Party Payors: Fee Schedules and the Sherman Act, 1978 DUKE L.J. 645.
All of these authors suggest useful ways to decrease costs of health care (while in some cases
increasing patients' choices) through application of antitrust law. See generally M. THOMPSON, ANTI-
TRUST AND THE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER (1979) (discussing the application of antitrust law to the
health care industry).
41. See 624 F.2d at 481. The court cited United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350 (1967), for the
proposition that a corporation can conspire with itself. In Sealy, mattress manufacturers joined to
form a "parent" corporation, which imposed exclusive territory requirements on the manufacturers
as part of a plan to license the Sealy trademark. The Court found a conspiracy because the manufac-
turers owned and controlled Sealy, the parent corporation.
The Fourth Circuit in Virginia Academy cites, but does not discuss, three classic boycott cases. In
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), brokers of the New York Stock Exchange
cut off the stock ticker service connections that the plaintiff needed to conduct business. The issue
was whether this conduct was protected by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78
(1976). The Court held that the conduct was not exempt under the Act because the defendants had
exceeded their limited authority to regulate themselves. Id. at 361. The Court applied the Rule of
Reason because of the Securities Act issue, but stated that, but for federal regulation, the defendants'
action would have constituted a per se violation of § I of the Sherman Act. Id. at 347.
In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961), the Court held
that plaintiff stated a claim under § I of the Sherman Act when it alleged that the defendant public
utilities refused to give the plaintiff's gas burner a seal of approval. The plaintiff's burner was a
newly invented model which did not meet the outdated standards of the American Gas Association.
The defendants refused to provide gas for consumers using plaintiff's burners. Id. at 658. The Court
used per se language when it condemned the restraint. See id. at 660.
In Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), the Court held that the Guild's regula-
tory program, designed to eliminate copying of dress designs through a group boycott, violated the
Sherman Act. Guild manufacturers agreed not to sell dresses to retailers who also sold copies of
dresses made by any Guild members. Id. at 462.
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group. 42 This differed from the Fourth Circuit's earlier holding in Ballard
v. Blue Shield of Southern West Virginia, Inc.,43 in which the court had
found a conspiracy among the defendants, who were sellers of Blue
Shield coverage, physician directors of Blue Shield, and the state medical
society. The court in Ballard did not consider Blue Shield a conspiracy of
physicians as such. 44 The reasoning in Virginia Academy is significant
because one physician-controlled Blue Shield Plan acting alone may now
be a conspiracy.
Once it found that the Blue Shield Plans comprised a concerted action,
the court looked at exemptions under the Sherman Act to determine
whether the Plans fit under those exemptions. The defendants argued that
they came within three exemptions: the state action doctrine; the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine; and the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption.
The state action doctrine exempts conduct that is compelled by a stat-
ute. 45 The court rejected the argument that the Blue Shield Plans fit this
exemption. It found that the Blue Shield Plans were not exempt under the
state action exemption because Virginia state law does not compel the
defendants to exclude psychologists from direct coverage. 46
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine 47 exempts efforts to petition the gov-
42. 624 F.2d at 480. The court said that it did not view Blue Shield as an agent of its subscribers,
but rather as an agent of its member physicians. Id. It quoted a Blue Shield advertising brochure that
was aimed at physicians. The brochure said that Blue Shield was known as the "doctors' plan for the
people," but was also the "doctors' plan for the doctors." Id. at 480 n.3.
43. 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976).
44. Id. at 1078.
45. The state action exemption was first set out in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The
Court there held that a state statute that required raisin growers to engage in price-fixing activity made
the action exempt from antitrust law. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.. 428 U.S. 579 (1976), the
Court held that the private anti-competitive action of a utility company fell outside of the Parker
exemption even when approved by a state utility regulation. Detroit Edison had given customers light
bulbs to promote usage of electricity for decades. The plan to promote usage of electricity had been
approved when the state first began regulating utilities.
The Court further limited the state action doctrine in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980). In Midcal, the Court held that a California wine price-
setting statute authorizing price fixing by competitors violated the Sherman Act. The Court required
actual state supervision for any state policy restraining trade. For a detailed discussion of the develop-
ment of the state action exemption and its application to the health care industry, see Miller, Antitrust
and Certificate of Need: Health Systems Agencies, the Planning Act, and Regulator), Capture. 68
GEO. L.J. 873, 893-900 (1980).
46. 624 F.2d at 482 n. 10. The court cited its earlier decision in Ballard. in which a state statute
specifically authorized insurers to insure the costs of chiropractic services. Id. The Virginia Freedom
of Choice Statute actually required the reimbursement of psychologists, so that the defendants were
clearly not protected by the state action exemption. See VA. CODE § 38.1-824 (1981).
47. This doctrine was developed in Eastern R.R. Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). The doctrine has
been extended to protect free speech in courts and agency hearings, as long as one party does not
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ernment to take political action even when the purpose of the petitioning
is anti-competitive. Petitioning the government is protected by the first
amendment, and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects that right from
the antitrust laws. 48 The court rejected the Noerr-Pennington exemption
because, rather than challenge the Virginia Freedom of Choice Statute in
the courts, the Blue Shield Plans had persisted in their policy not to com-
ply with the law. 49
The McCarran-Ferguson Act50 exempts those aspects of the insurance
industry that are regulated by state law. 51 The court also rejected the
McCarran-Ferguson exemption, holding that the defendants' policy was
not squarely a risk-underwriting decision, which constitutes the essence
of the business of insurance. 52
The court then turned to the "final, critical issue" of "whether these
combinations were 'in restraint of trade.' ,,53 The court looked at the
anti-competitive effects of the challenged practices and found that the
Blue Shield Plans restrained trade because the Plans conditioned pay-
ments to competing providers by forcing them to act as one with physi-
cian members. The defendants' policy, which reimbursed only psycholo-
gists who billed through a physician, either prevents a psychologist from
practicing independently or deprives the psychologist of third-party reim-
bursement. This puts the psychologist at a competitive disadvantage in
comparison to the physician. 54
The court applied the Rule of Reason standard to conclude that the
Blue Shield Plans violated the Sherman Act. 55 The plaintiffs argued that
the court should apply the per se rule. They argued that the Blue Shield
Plans were boycotts and were therefore per se illegal. The plaintiffs cited
48. Virginia Academy, 624 F.2d at 482.
49. Id. at 482. The district court had held that the Plans' decision to challenge the statute was
protected by the first amendment. 469 F. Supp. at 557. The Plans did not institute any legal action
themselves. See note 8 supra. Instead, they persisted with the policy in defiance of the statute. 624
F.2d at 479. The court said that this conduct amounted to "no more than an agreement to persist in
economically restrictive commercial activity in the face of a state law designed to open up the health
care market." Id. at 482.
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).
51. The exemption does not extend, under statutory language, to boycotts. Id. § 1013b.
52. 624 F.2d at 483-84. The court relied on the narrow definition of the business of insurance
elucidated in Group Life & Health Ins. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979). In Royal Drug, the
Supreme Court held that agreements between pharmacies and Blue Shield to charge cost plus $2.00
for prescriptions were not the "business of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. at 214.
The Court stated that the primary elements of the business of insurance are the spreading and un-
derwriting of a policyholder's risk. Id. at 211. In both Virginia Academy and Royal Drug, the agree-
ments did not involve the spreading or underwriting of risk.
53. 624F.2dat484 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)).
54. Third-party payment for health care services is pervasive. See note 3 supra.
55. 624 F.2d at 485.
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Ballard, in which the court had held that Blue Shield Plans and a medical
society formed a group boycott of chiropractors. 56 The Virginia Academy
court rejected this argument, although it admitted that the challenged pol-
icy "closely resembles" 5 7 that alleged in Ballard. The court rejected the
per se rule because of the "special considerations involved in the delivery
of health services," 58 but did not indicate what those special considera-
tions might be. 59
The court instead applied the Rule of Reason standard. It looked at the
language of the Blue Shield Plans' bill-through policy and found its pur-
pose to be anti-competitive. 60 The court rejected the defendants' argu-
ment that the motive behind the policy was improved quality of care. It
said that if the motive were improved quality of care, the policy would
have required physician supervision or consultation, rather than billing. 6'
The fact that the restriction operated upon billing, however, was indica-
tive of a commercial purpose.
The defendants also argued that because their conduct was "good med-
ical practice" 62 and therefore had a redeeming value, it was not illegal
under the Rule of Reason. The court cited National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States,63 in which the Supreme Court had held
that concerns about safety in engineering did not justify anti-competitive
conduct.
To summarize, the Fourth Circuit held that the Blue Shield Plans were
acting as agents for their physician members in a conspiracy to restrain
trade, by forcing psychologists to bill through physicians to obtain insur-
ance payments for psychotherapy services. The court narrowly construed
the asserted exemptions to liability and found the defendants liable for
56. Id. at 484. The defendants in Ballard had conspired to refuse third-party reimbursement for
chiropractic services. The court found that this conduct was not exempt under the learned profession
exemption, which the United States Supreme Court had abolished in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.
421 U.S. 733 (1975). Ballard, 543 F.2d at 1075-79. The court in Ballard also held that the defen-
dants' acts justified a finding of boycott, which is outside the protection of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. Id.
57. 624F.2d at 484.
58. Id.
59. The court cited two cases in support of its rejection of the per se rule. First, the court cited
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 733 (1975), although the Goldfarb Court used per se lan-
guage and stated clearly that price fixing activity by professionals was not related to a state's regula-
tion of the professions to promote public safety. Id. at 793; see note 34 supra (discussing Goldfarb).
The court also cited Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980).
rev'd, 50 U.S.L.W. 4687 (U.S. June 18, 1982) (No. 80-419), in which the Ninth Circuit refused to
apply the per se rule in the absence of a full trial on the nature of the health industry.
60. 624 F.2d at 485.
61. Id.at485.
62. Id.
63. 435 U.S. 679 (1979).
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this restraint of trade. The court based its finding of a restraint of trade in
part on the historical evidence of physician control over Blue Shield and
in part on the resultant reduction in competition in health care services. 64
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
The decision in Virginia Academy promotes the application of antitrust
law to health care services in several ways. First, it follows up on the
court's earlier decision in Ballard v. Blue Shield of Southern West Vir-
ginia, Inc.,65 which abolished the learned profession exemption as a de-
fense to physicians' liability for antitrust violations. 66 Second, it goes be-
yond the court's Ballard decision in recognizing Blue Shield itself as a
combination of physicians. 67 Third, it holds that those physicians acted
illegally when they sought to coerce the trade practices of competing psy-
chologists. 68
Despite these advances, the court should have gone further. The court
should have labeled the defendants' conduct a boycott and should have
used the per se rule in finding the antitrust violation.
The court had previously found that conduct similar to the defendants'
constituted a boycott, in Ballard. In Ballard the Fourth Circuit held that
the alleged conduct of the defendant Blue Shield fit within the definition
of a boycott, and therefore was outside the scope of the McCarran-Fergu-
son exemption. 69 Nevertheless, in Virginia Academy the court failed to
find that the defendants' conduct was a boycott. This failure is not ade-
quately explained. 70
The conduct of the defendants in Virginia Academy resembles conduct
found to be a boycott in several Supreme Court cases. In Associated Press
v. United States,71 the defendant, a news service consisting of various
64. 624 F.2d at 479 n.2.
65. 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976).
66. See Virginia Academy, 624 F.2d at 484-85.
67. Id. at 479-80.
68. Id. at 484.
69. See notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra.
70. The court cited Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979),
which held that a traditional form of minimum pricing in the market for music under copyright was
not illegal per se, although it was not exempt under copyright law from antitrust liability. Virginia
Academy, 624 F.2d at 484. The Court in Broadcast Music reasoned that it had not had enough experi-
ence with performing rights in the music industry to outlaw the type of licensing used as a per se
restraint of trade. 441 U.S. at 10. Presumably, the Virginia Academy court believed the same to be
true of health care. Cases that involve anti-competitive conduct in health care delivery question this
assertion, however. See notes 83-92 and accompanying text infra.
71. 326 U.S. 1 (1945). Associated Press was a cooperative organization which collected, assem-
bled, and distributed news to various newspaper members. The Court held that arrangements to stifle
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newspapers throughout the country, had a policy which gave existing
members veto power over new applicants in their geographic area and
which prohibited furnishing news to non-members. The Court held that
this conduct was a boycott despite the defendant's defense of business
necessity. Similarly, the defendants in Virginia Academy joined in a
group to exclude psychologists unless the psychologists had met the con-
dition of billing through a physician. The quality-of-care defense, like the
business necessity defense asserted in Associated Press, is inadequate to
prove an acceptable purpose for the anti-competitive conduct. The nature
of the conduct itself demonstrated amply in both cases the anti-competi-
tive purpose of the defendants.
Conduct that is illegal per se under classic antitrust doctrine has been
held to be illegal per se in some cases involving professions besides the
medical profession. Like boycotts, agreements to fix prices are generally
per se illegal.72 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,73 the Supreme Court
found price fixing by a state bar association to be illegal without applying
Rule of Reason analysis. Although not explicitly stated, the Court used
the per se rule. 74
The Court did not use the per se standard in National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States.75 Instead, it used the Rule of Reason to
find illegal a prohibition against competitive bidding because the Court
found that the conduct was not price fixing. 76 If the Court had found price
fixing, as it had in Goldfarb, the Court would likely have found it illegal
per se. 77
Goldfarb shows that the Supreme Court is willing to apply the per se
rule to professionals. National Society of Engineers is consistent with
Goldfarb. Concerns about quality of service are equally appropriate to
law, engineering, and medicine. Citing National Society of Engineers,
the Virginia Academy court asserted that "it is not the function of a group
of professionals to decide that competition is not beneficial in their line of
work." 78 Self-regulation to promote quality of service can be accom-
plished without resort to boycotts or price fixing, which should be con-
demned as illegal per se.
competition would not be immunized just because the defendants used a membership device. Id. at
19.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940): United States v.
Trenton Potteries, Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1929); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons. 220
U.S. 373 (1911).
73. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
74. See id. at 783; Comment, supra note 31, at 399 n.36.
75. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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The court refused, however, to adopt the per se rule in Virginia Acad-
emy. The court said simply that the "special considerations involved in
the delivery of health services" 79 justified this result. The court did not
elaborate on what these special considerations might be. The following
possible justifications are suggested by the opinions of other courts: (1)
the medical profession is not profit-seeking;80 (2) such anti-competitive
practices are justified to promote safe care;8' and (3) there is a competi-
tive market in health care.82 These "special considerations," however,
do not justify conduct that is illegal per se.
First, a historical look at organized medicine's efforts to stop the devel-
opment of health maintenance organizations8 3 reveals the profit-seeking
nature of the profession. Medical societies in Oregon,84 Washington, 85
and the District of Columbia86 have attempted to drive competing health
maintenance organizations out of business. The medical societies ex-
cluded participating physicians from membership, and as a result the phy-
sicians lost hospital privileges and were unable to consult with other phy-
sicians. 87
79. Id. at 484.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y. 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952) (distin-
guishing professional relationships from "usual considerations prevailing in ordinary commercial
matters"). Commentators point out that nonprofit entities, which are common in health care, are
assumed to be less competitive than profit-oriented industries. E.g., M. THOMPSON, supra note 27, at
35.
81. Cf. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 329 (1952) (emphasizing
that needed medical treatment had been delayed while awaiting insurer approval); Virginia Academy
of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 469 F. Supp. 552, 560-61 (E.D. Va. 1979) (defer-
ring to the physician's judgment regarding the "medical necessity" for psychotherapy services),
rev'd, 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981); Feminist Women's Health
Center v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (N.D. Fla. 1976) (considering the "good inten-
tions" and "public welfare burden" in evaluating a boycott of the plaintiffs health center), rev'd,
586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 334 (1952) (finding
that physicians were "now competitors in the field"). Contra Goldberg & Greenberg, supra note 3.
Professor Beauchamp asserts that the market-justice model has been the dominant value in health
care: only those who can purchase health care services through their own efforts are entitled to them.
Beauchamp, Public Health as Social Justice, 8 INQUIRY 1, 3-14 (1976). Government regulation, as
well as provider dominance, serves to undercut the free market. M. THOMPSON, supra note 27, at
25-33.
83. Health maintenance organizations accept contracted responsibility to assure the delivery of a
certain range of health services, including ambulatory and hospital care to a voluntarily enrolled
population in exchange for an advance payment. They assume part of the financial risk for the deliv-
ery of services. M. THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 2 n.3.
84. See United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
85. See Group Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wn. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737
(1951) (reviewing in detail the efforts of organized medicine to fight one of the earliest health mainte-
nance organizations, in an opinion covering over 80 pages of the Washington Reports).
86. See American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
87. Havighurst, supra note 40, at 307-08. Physicians have traditionally exerted a great deal of
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Second, physicians can provide safe care without resorting to anti-
competitive practices. Safe care concerns often arise only after charges
have been filed in antitrust suits. Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc.
v. Mohammad88 provides a good example. The defendants there were
private gynecologists who pressured other doctors to refuse to provide
low-cost abortions at the plaintiff's health center. The private gynecolo-
gists asserted that the clinic did not provide adequate follow-up care. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a summary judgment in
favor of the defendants based on evidence that the gynecologists had be-
gun their attack only when a local newspaper story had revealed the low
cost of the services and on that evidence that the same physicians had
refused to allow the local hospital to provide follow-up services. 89
Third, price fixing is common in health care, 90 which questions the free
market assumption. For example, in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medi-
cal Society, 91 members of the Medical Society charged fees in accordance
with a uniform schedule based on an agreement with the medical insurer.
The Supreme Court in Maricopa County held that a medical care founda-
tion's publication of maximum fee schedules for reimbursement of physi-
cians is price fixing and therefore per se illegal under the Sherman Act. 92
The Virginia Academy court should not have relied on vague "special
considerations" in refusing to find the Blue Shield Plans' conduct to be a
boycott. It was a boycott because physician members of Blue Shield re-
fused to permit insurance reimbursement for psychologists unless they
billed through a physician. By recognizing it to be a boycott and by ap-
plying the per se rule, the court could have furthered the purposes of the
antitrust laws.
The per se rule serves to increase the predictability of the outcome of
litigation. Predictability facilitates pre-trial settlement, thereby reducing
litigation costs. 93 More importantly, the per se rule serves to deter anti-
competitive behavior by a clear warning to would-be perpetrators of boy-
cotts. 94
Application of the per se rule would support a reversal of the district
court's decision in Virginia Academy favoring the Neuropsychiatric Soci-
control over health care through a variety of means. The limited accessibility of medical education is
a significant barrier to entry, which limits the number of new practitioners in the field. This in turn
increases the influence of those already established. Id.
88. 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
89. Id. at 536-38.
90. Havighurst, supra note 40. at 317.
91. 50 U.S.L.W. 4687 (U.S. June 18, 1982) (No. 80-419).
92. Id.
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ety of Virginia. 95 Psychiatrist members of this group were heavily in-
volved in Blue Shield's decision. 96 Evidence that "inquiry, consultation,
and negotiation clearly took place,' ,97 and that this occurred immediately
before Blue Shield's decision to deny coverage, 98 should be sufficient
where the purpose and effect of the policy were to exclude competing
providers. Coercion need not be an element of a Sherman Act violation
when physician members of the Society and of Blue Shield benefit by
eliminating the competition of independent psychologists in psychother-
apy services. 99 The bill-through policy eliminated competition by raising
the out-of-pocket costs to consumers using the services of independent
psychologists because patients were required to pay their full fee. Con-
sumers were more likely to use psychiatrists, because most of their fees
were reimbursed by Blue Shield. The court should have applied the per se
rule to hold that the Neuropsychiatric Society's conduct violated the anti-
trust laws.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has analyzed the Fourth Circuit's decision in Virginia Acad-
emy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Virginia in the context of
classic antitrust doctrine. The Note has suggested-that the court should
have gone further to label the defendants' conduct a boycott and to con-
demn it as illegal per se. Application of the per se rule would be more
consistent with antitrust doctrine.
Ultimately, application of the per se rule to the health care industry,
and the concomitant increase in competition, is consistent with the as-
serted goals of antitrust law. 00 Increasing competition should help not
only to decrease costs,101 increase efficiency, 102 and promote progress in
95. In the actual case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in favor of the
Neuropsychiatric Society. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
96. 469 F. Supp. at 558.
97. Id. at 559.
98. Id. at 558.
99. Not only is coercion not a requirement of a violation of §1, but the United States Supreme
Court held in Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealer's Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612
(1914), that an express agreement is not even required.
100. See P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 93, § 103.
101. An increase in competition may provide less expensive alternatives for consumers. Id.
Other providers of health care as well as psychologists may offer less expensive services. For exam-
ple, midwives generally offer less expensive maternity care than obstetricians. Nurse practitioners
may provide certain primary health care services to generally healthy people at a lower cost than
physicians trained in internal medicine. Many of these providers can offer high quality lower cost
service. See Dolan & Ralston, HospitalAdmitting Privileges and the Sherman Act, 18 Hous. L. REv.
707, 728-33 (1981).
102. Antitrust law tends to further efficiency in the use and allocation of scarce resources. P.
AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 93, § 103.
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the development of new technology, 10 3 but also to promote populist
goals, including dispersion of wealth, 04 increased entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities, and limited business size. 105
Donna M. Moniz
103. Pro-competitive policy aims toward progress in the development of new techniques. Id. In
the context of the health care industry, alternative providers may offer a less traditional approach to
human problems. Often this means a more individualized focus aimed at the whole person instead of
a disease-oriented traditional medical model. A good example is the changing approach to childbirth.
Consumers and midwives have both played important roles in making birth a more satisfying experi-
ence for women. V. WALTON, HAVE IT YOUR WAY 51-56 (1978).
104. Pro-competitive policy tends to disperse wealth. It would tend to decrease the income of
physicians while increasing that of other health care providers and increasing savings for consumers.
See M. GREEN. B. MOORE, JR. & B. WASSERSTEIN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 265-69 (1972).
105. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 93, § 103.
